Since 1967, when Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta drew the attention of the General Assembly to the inadequacy of inte~national arrangements for the uses of the ocean, this inadequacy has been a subject of discussion and sometimes intense debate within the United Nations.
These debates have included the question of how to delimit the outer edge of the legal continental shelf, the spectrum of ocean arms control possibilities, proposals to create a de~laration of principles governing the exploration for and the exploitation of seabed minerals resources, proposals which insist that exploitation take place only if it "benefits mankind as a whole," especially the Developing states, and consideration of schemes to create international machinery to regulate, license, or own the resources of the seabed and subsoil. These discussions and debates began in the First Committee of the 22d Assemb~y and proceeded through an Ad Hoc Committee to the 23d and 24th Assemblies. The creation of a Permanent Committee on the Seabed as a part of the General Assembly machinery attests to the importance members of the United NatiQns attribute to ocean problems.
The states of the international system will be faced in the foreseeable future with finding solutions to a host of substantive oceanic problems. When these decisions will be made is not known. But they cannot be long postponed, especially in the light of passage by the 24th Assembly of a resolution which calls for the convening of a new international conference to deal with a wide range of law of the sea problems. l IUNGAOR, 24th Session, Report of the First Committee, December 9, 1969 (A/7834), p. 13. The U.N. seabed debates are the most comprehensive single body of data available on the attitude of states on the problems of managing the uses of the ocean. They are the only available body of data through which, without piecing together an enormous number of scattered bits of information, we can get an overview of the patterns of state opinions on ocean questions. 2 As such they should be useful in trying to illuminate the possible outcomes of the debate. We believe that patterns of state preference have emerged and are discoverable through the analysis of the seabed debates. 3 Further, we believe that we have developed a method of analysis of the data which is appropriate to the problem. The technique is a particular application of quantitative thematic content analysis.
4 How and why this technique can be applied to U.N. debate material, the nature and problems of the method, a case study demonstrating some of the substantive results that were reached, and a statement of our future research priorities we believe to be subjects which will interest other scholars of the United Nations.
2For a review of the literature and an attempt to impose a typology on the conceptual ideas in the debate see: R. Quantitative Content Analysis of U.N. Materials
There are cons~derable advantages to using U.N. debate documents as data (verbatim and summary records and/or provisional verbatim and summary records of floor proceedings of General Assembly plenary sessions, sessions of main committees, ad hoc committees, and working groups). Some advantages are characteristic generally of all U.N. debate records, but others apply to the specific ocean debates and make them peculiarly advantageous for Our purposes.
One general advantage of U.N. records is that the data are susceptible to being compared. The speakers were addressing each other using a common set of spoken languages and using a reasonably common set of symbols.
Another is that the data are public and accessible to anyone within reasonable distance of a U.N. repository library. Third, there are few problems of accounting for all the data, since the documents are numbered serially.
Thus there are no problems of physically missing data, e.g., a missing telegram, a diplomatic diary which a late diplomat's family will not release necessary for a study of diplomatic interaction, etc. The most important advantage of using the ocean debates for a project on ocean problems is the fact that the debate data are comprehensive. By this we mean that a large number of countries discussed virtually all the known issues of ocean problems. Another specific advantage of the ocean debates is that there is no necessity of _sampling (with its concomitant problems), the body of data not being so large that sampling is required (but we are aware of the fact that the U.N. materials are themselves a "sample" of a larger universe of materials on state attitudes on ocean problems). In short, we had a reasonably large but manageable body of data--approximately 85 documents containing over 4000 pages so far. propaganda is in itself significant.
In the case of the seabed debates the possibility that the U.N.
records might be unrepresentative and might mislead the investigators is reduced by one of the writers' close acquaintance with the subject and the debates--both through study and his attendance at some of the sessions.
A second set of problems is related--the necessity of taking into of a previous position will show up later in the record, or, if not, the uncharacteristic position of the state will often be glaringly obvious.
As to esoteric and technical language, we believe we have successfully deciphered it and have conveyed the meanings to the cader, thus making U.N. discourse transparent.
The documents also may contain potential problems as documents.
Errors may be made by a speaker, a translator, or a summarizer. For example, a speaker may not be speaking in his native tongue and may not be totally facile or idiomatic in the working language he was using.
A translator may also introduce other errors. Since some of the documents we are working with are summary records rather than verbatim transcripts, the summarizer may also have contributed to misrepresenting a speaker's words. We will argue that most such errors are minor. They could become an important problem if too detailed a research design were used, which required an accurate rendering of whole sentences or a specific word count. We did not proceed this way, partly for this reason, using instead a technique to capture themes.
-5- In sum, we think U.N. debate records can be used successfully for our purposes--to reveal the patterns of state opinion on ocean problems.
(1) The body of data is large and representative enough of a stateTs public statements on the problems. (2) We take account of as many sources of error in designing our method as possible. (3) We do not represent our data base as the universe, but only as the single best source for gaining insight into the problem.
Once it is decided that United Nations debate records will be the data base for a research project, the researcher has already limited his choice of appropriate method to some form of content analysis, either qualitative or quantitative. From this spot checking, we concluded that the coding was sufficiently accurate.
Another difficulty with our thematic analysis is the ambiguity in the meaning of a mention of a theme. Although we interpret the mention of a theme as reflecting a country's positive orientation, some speeches were devoted to attacking themes the speaking nation disliked. We believe, however, that national representatives spent most of their effort on themes they favored. One possible solution to this problem in the future is to code -9-whether the theme was mentioned in a positive or negative light.
The second step in our method is the organization of themes into general topics, which we call variables, suggested by the internal evidence of the debates. As is often the case in U.N. debates the title of the item on the agenda suggests a general topic upon which the participants in the debates base their remarks. In other cases the specific phrases were used to comment for or against a particular proposal. These general topics were comparatively easy to identify. We The themes in each variable were then ranked on a national-international continuum; themes appearing high on each list were judged to be more internationalistic than those low on 8ach list.
In contrast to the division of the debate into themes, the collection of themes into variables and their ordering are public and are given in Table 1 . The reader may not agree with the way he did this; at least he can see what decisions were made, and we can explain why we made the choices we did.
-10- Must define seabed area 2.
Necessary to define national jurisdiction 3.
Necessary to define territorial waters 4.
Necessary to define continental margin 5.
Not necessary to define national jurisdiction, not affected 6.
Not necessary to define national jurisdiction, not alterable 7.
Territorial waters not under discussion Present international law of seabed inadequate 3.
"Exploitability" invalid due to technological advances 4.
Geneva Convention invalid 5.
Revise Geneva Convention 6.
Revise in accordance with international law (including other Geneva Conventions) 7.
Revise in accordance with established Conventions 8 • Geneva Shelf Convention valid 9.
Exploitability valid 10.
Respect territorial integrity 11.
Maintain national jurisdiction as established by practice Define national jurisdiction as soon as possible 3.
Define "principles" of exploitation after defining continental shelf 4.
Redefine Geneva Convention at 3rd Law of the Sea Conference 5.
Define "principles" first, prior to defining seabed area 6.
Define national jurisdiction after the "principles'! 7.
Delay redefinition of continental shelf 8.
Maintain national right to extend claims
As an example of our procedure, let us demonstrate why we scaled the themes in Variable 1 as we did. Essentially all these themes related to the question of who had what rights to define which offshore area. The #1 theme represented to us the acme of internationalism. Speakers who used it were saying that only the international community has the right -11-to define all the various seabed areas, those falling under international as well as national jurisdiction. The second theme is less comprehensive, claiming for the international community the right to define various zones of national jurisdiction. The third is even more specific and restrictive of the right of the international community. The fourth theme starts to edge toward conceding more powers to the nation-states. By claiming that the international community has a right at least to define the continental margin, this argument perhaps concedes that the continental slope as well as the continental shelf can properly be subjected to coastal-state jurisdiction. Themes 5-7, in tones of increasing stridency and hostility, were put forth by speakers who insisted that only the nation-states could be judges of the extent of their own national jurisdiction. The most nationalistic insisted that the unilateral acts of these states were not even fit subjects for international discussion.
Next, a number was associated with each theme--namely the rank of the theme in its variable list in Table 1 . Thus each occure.1ce of "necessary to define territorial waters TT was given a score of 3, and "territorial waters not under discussion" a score of 7.
This method is a special case of "artificial measurement", the assignment of numbers to variables one might have thought of as unq uantifiable. Without Table 1 , the assignment of the number 3 to a theme in a internationalist-nationalist continuum on the variable "continental shelf definition" would have been without operational meaning.
With Table 1 , however, the meaning of such an assignment is unambiguous.
Artificial measurement was used in an earlier study to measure the hostility of nations T actions. 8 Using a set of marker actions developed for the study, the authors gave each act a score equal to the number of marker actions that act was judged to exceed in hostility. Our case here is simpler because all the themes corresponding to each of the variables are listed in Table 1 .
There are several issues about artificial measurement which deserve clarification. First, what might be the effect of cln omitted theme? Th'Jt is, if there were truly eight potential positions on Variable 1, but no one expressed the eighth position, how would our analysis be affected?
Clearly 1 would be added to the score of all themes more nationalistic than the omitted theme, which would have minor influence on our results.
Even if many errors of this type were made, provided the same number, say n , were omitted between each pair of observed themes, and n omitted were more internationalistic than the most internationalistic observed theme, the effect would only be to multiply each score by n Finally, what might be the effect of various kinds of transformations?
Here it is supposed that there is an underlying TTtrue TT internationalism of each theme with respect to its variable. Further, the themes are supposed to be in correct order. Then any monotonic transformation of TTtrue TT internationalism will leave that order intact, and hence leave the ranks in Table 1 unchanged. Thus our analysis is unchanged by any monotonic transformation of internationalism, and is in this sense treated as ordinal. However once themes have been assigned numbers equal to their ranks, the ranks themselves can be treated as meaningful absolute numbers.
-13-For each state which mentioned any theme, a variable score was then computed by summing the ranks of all theme references made by a state and dividing by the number of theme references; it is a number which represents a state's average or typical view on a topic or variable. For example, if country X mentions the theme "necessary to define national jurisdiction" once and "necessary to define territorial waters" twice and The major alternative way to define a variable score is by the median theme score for that variable and state. Because theme scores are not widely dispersed (going from 1 to 7, 1 to 11 and 1 to 8) means are well-behaved, and acceptable as variable scores. The medians are wellbehaved also; in fact we believe that the mean and the median are close and our analysis could have used either. We chose the mean. Because Variable 2 has more themes than Variable 1, the scores for Definition and Continental Shelf Criteria are both one standard deviation higher (more nationalistic) than is average for states. Table II gives the transformed scores for all variables.
(Insert Table II The three variables reported here exhibit a high degree of correlation. They correlate with each other more highly than they do with any of the 16 other variables in the larger study. In previous studies of this type many authors have recorded the significance level of the test of the null hypothesis that the correlation is non-positive, that is, the probability, if the true correlation were zero, of observing a sample correlation at least as high as that observed. We find a significance level of this type uniformative.
The main thing making the significance level close to zero is the sample size. As we already know that the probability above is close to zero, precise computation of it would not materially add to our study.
The following case study interprets figure 2 and similar graphs The most pressing problem debated in Assembly ocean debates w~w hether it was necessary to delimit the outer edge of the legal continental shelf, and how to do it.
Unfortunately, the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 established a standard that has been a source of controversy ever since. Because it is technically difficult to establish a specific borderline in a zone whose geological shapes vary widely,9 and because the treaty writers attempted to anticipate improvement in man's technological ability to exploit at greater and greater depths, the continental shelf outer edge is defined by dual criteria. According to Article 1 of the Convention, the continental shelf is "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the lIThe subject of seabed resources has been of considerable concern to the United Nations, see: UNESC Introduction with variable 2 (on the criteria for redefinition). To muke the relationships easier to understand we can take the data on these two variablc0
from Table I and plot them. This was done in figure 2.
The most distinctive aspect of the seabed debate that emerges is the rather extreme nationalistic positions taken by the Latin American states, the core of which are the "CEP states," Chile, Ecuador and Peru.
They are found neatly grouped in the Northeast quarter of the figure.
Their basic preference in the 22nd and 23rd session debates was to avoid the discussion of continental shelf delimitation. As their response on variable 1 shows, the Latin Americans did not wish to redefine the edge on the legal shelf; they did not wish to discuss any aspect of offshore rights. They regarded discussions of the continental shelf delimitation as an oblique attack upon their other idiosyncratic offshore claims. In rejoinder they grouped all offshore claims under their own notions of "national jurisdiction," "sovereignty, TT and "territorial waters." What they did in effect was to use "general purpose zone" concepts to respond to a debate about the inadequacy of a definition of the outer boundary of a "special purpose zone. of their nationalism on the line before the forum of world opinion. We do not think it likely that they will give them up. Certainly we do not believe they will budge publicly; we are even dubious that a compromise proposal acceptable to them could be constructed; while we hope otherwise, we are not even sure that it is possible to get any degree of coopera- This group is composed of those states with negative values on both variables. They are located in the southwest quarter of figure 2. They are primarily European and Asian states--Austria, Belgium, Norway, Finland; Rumania, Cyprus, Pakistan, and Japan. They grouped together on the two dimensions because they expressed opinions favorable to reform -21-of the Continental Shelf Convention. On variable 1 they were inclined to support the necessity of defining the continental margin, or defining territorial waters. Obviously they supported the redefinition of the edge of the shelf so that the end of the area of national jurisdiction would be known. On themes related to variable 2, the members of this group tended to express the belief in the necessity of revising the Convention, claiming that in its present form it is invalid, primarily because the "exploitability" clause of the dual criteria has been outmoded by technological advances.
In the northwest quadrant we find a very loose, small and, as a group, probably not too significant collection of states we will call the "moderate conservativesTT--Ceylon, New Zealand, the Byelorussian SSR and Indonesia. These states seem to agree that the continental shelf In the southeast corner we find only two states: Malta and India.
They stand out by their lonely eminence and--using our knowledge of the substance of debates--by their importance in the debates. It is therefore WOrth making some educated guesses as to why they find themselves exposed in conspicuous positions.
-22-Malta, whose ambassador was so instrumental in getting the sedbe r ] issue placed prominently on the U.N. agenda, attempted to playa leadership role. As a leader in the debate, Malta tried very hard to press for reform without antagonizing any substantial group whose non-cooperation would make reform more difficult. We believe this is reflected in figure   2 . On variable 1 we believe Malta was trying to indicate that reform would not imperil any state's "national jurisdiction," while insisting on variable 2 that either there is no present international law applicable to the seabed or that what little there is, is inadequate. In any case the "exploitability" criterion for the edge of the shelf is invalid.
India is a different case, and interpreting her position requires more speculation. She too had a prominent role in the debates, with her delegate, Mr. R. C. Arora, as vice-chairman of the Economic and Technical Working Group of the Ad Hoc Conunittee. But India appears to have an equivocal position on the question of continental shelf reform. On the one hand she mildly supports positions such as revision of the continental shelf in accordance with international law and established conventions (variable 2). On the other hand she has recorded her opposition to any attempt to have the international community "define" her "national jurisdiction" (variable 1). It is not unreasonable to speculate that India might be reserving her position so that she may make a larger offshore claim than at present if the U.N. seabed debates do not lead to a resolution of the question of the continental shelf that she claims meets her needs.
In this debate, where are the superpowers? Like Sherlock Holmes' dog that was significant because it did not bark in the night, the United States The silence of the Soviet Union, we suspect, is not an accident. She chose not to speak. It is worth noting that of the 19 variables we have been able to identify, the Soviets chose to speak on 16 of 19. Two of the three subjects on which she did not speak directly concerned the continental shelf (and the third, also characteristically, concerned who shall benefit economically from seabed exploitation). Only on variable 1 did they take a mildly reformist position. In contrast the USSR was quite voluble in the 16 subjects she chose to discuss, making an average Overall, these latter two figures, which use variable 3 on "how to proceed" on the continental shelf problem, demonstrate a fact long known about the United Nations--that you get behavior patterns on questions involving process or procedure similar to those on substantive questions. 14 14This has been clearly demonstrated for formal procedural votes under U.N. voting rules. Using factor analysis techniques, procedural votes factor directly into the clusters on substantive issues. See R. L. Friedheim "Factor Analysis as a Tool in Studying the Law of the Sea," 53.
-25- There were a number of states that took positions on figures 3 and 4 which made them visually obvious. Some were taking positions which were consistent with their traditional law of the sea stands and are therefore easy to explain.
-26- Gathered in the southwest corner of the figures, most of these states hover just above and below -1.0 on the two dimensions plotted.
As a result they cannot be characterized as extreme radicals but rather as steady proponents of preventing national boundaries from spilling over into the now non-national areas of the seabed. They wanted to define the limits of national jurisdiction (variable 1), they found the lTexploitabilityTT clause inadequate to preserve the interests of the world community (variable 2) and they wanted to correct this situation soon (variable 3). Some even advocated a moratorium on claims. The insistence of these states that the continental shelf delimitation criterion be reformed, and that the growing number of offshore exploitative activities requires action soon holds much promise for reform, and also a considerable element of danger. Much will depend upon the sophistication of their understanding of the political relationship and problems.
They may well recruit other states to the banner of reform (principally, no doubt, from among the Developing), but if they proceed to neglect the interest of the Developed entirely, and pass reform resolutions over the protests of the Developed, they may well force the Developed to flout the reform resolutions or not cooperate in drawing up new ocean conventions.
Their victory could be hollow.
One other relationship that might bear on the future outcome of the continental shelf debate was exposed in another step in the analysis. We subjected the whole body of data on the seabed debates to a stepwise 17 multiple regression program.
Although we do not wish here to enter the At first glance, it would seem reasonable that a topic which concerns a specific reform (Variable 1: the need for a redefinition of the continental shelf) would correlate highly with a topic that concerns the need or lack of need for reform generally in the law of the seabed (Variable 4).
-30-That they are related does make good sense. But it would be tempting, and incorrect, based on the relationship, to make the corollary assumption that most of those states who had "nationalist On the opposing side,in the southeast quadrant, are the Latin Americans. They complained fervently that the present law was nonexistent or unjust, and ripe for reform. When, however, faced with the most critical short-run reform in the law of the sea--delimiting the end of nationally controlled continental shelf area--they would have none of it.
The continental shelf debate was not without its ironies.
-31- derived from one or more independent sets of data on the same subject. We are now actively seeking other bodies of data on ocean problems susceptible to quantification. Comparison of the bodies of data would be helpful in allowing us to evaluate the usefulness of our methods and the soundness of our conclusions.
-32-
